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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE COMMODITIES 
CHALLENGE: THE EVENTUAL ‗GREENING‘ OF THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANISATION? 
 
GREGORY MESSENGER* 
 
Comprehensive and concerted action by the international community is 
required to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set out in the 
United Nation‘s 2030 Agenda. Yet, the 2030 Agenda is largely silent on a 
number of key issues of relevance to international regulation, most notably the 
impact of commodities on sustainable development. This article identifies the 
central role that trade in commodities plays in sustainable development while 
outlining the inherent tensions within the fragmented international regulation 
of commodities‘ trade. This article looks at the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) as a site of innovative global governance in tackling the impact of one 
commodity–fish–examining how the international community and the WTO 
have been shifting the narrative in meeting the SDGs from one of overlapping 
or conflicting regimes to cooperative governance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic development is a core objective of the World Trade Organisation1 and 
forms a part of the underpinning ideological framework for trade liberalisation.2 
Nonetheless, the relationship between trade liberalisation and development has 
historically been a tense one, pitting entrenched developed economies against 
developing members and bringing competing views within each group, over the 
appropriate interpretation or application of development as a policy objective, in 
conflict.3 
 
Further, sustainable development (that is, development that ―meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs‖)4 presents an additional challenge, requiring trade law to accommodate the 
economic, environmental, and social dimensions of development.5 Since its 
creation, the WTO has struggled with this image of being skewed toward trade 
                                                        
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Liverpool (gregory.messenger[at]liverpool.ac.uk). I 
am grateful for the comments that I have received on all or part of this piece from 
Stephanie Switzer, Alice Tipping, and the Editors. Section IV of this article draws on work 
conducted for the International Law Association Committee on Sustainable Development 
and the Green Economy in International Trade Law in collaboration with Stefan 
Amarasinha. The views presented here, as well as all errors and omissions, are my own. 
1 ―Recognising that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be 
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large 
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the 
world‘s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a 
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development‖. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, First 
recital, Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
2 See generally M. HERDEGEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 13-15 
(2013); P. VAN DEN BOSSCHE & W. ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANISATION 4-30 (3d ed. 2013). For a more critical analysis, see also P. Krugman, 
What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 113 (1997). 
3 For an evocative account of such debates, see N. Lamp, The ―Development‖ Discourse in 
Multilateral Trade Lawmaking, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 475 (2017). 
4 Rep. of World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 
42nd Sess., ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987). 
5 On the ‗three dimensions‘ of sustainable development, see U.N. Secretary-General, 
Mainstreaming of the Three Dimensions of Sustainable Development Throughout the United Nations 
System,  ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A72/75-E/2017/56 (Apr. 5, 2017). 
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liberalisation over other public policy concerns, whether meeting the development 
needs of members or the environmental impact of liberalisation.6 
 
Instead of viewing the WTO as an antagonist in the pursuit of sustainable 
development and the institutions of free trade as the source of challenges, this 
article focusses on the primary objects of trade–commodities.7 Rather than rooting 
the challenges faced by the global community in the WTO, the lens is turned 
toward the key role that commodities play in sustainable development. Attention is 
drawn to commodities as a source of instability and dependence, which necessarily 
creates challenges for the economic and legal frameworks on which sustainable 
development is built. It is argued that the WTO is shifting from a primary 
commercial interest‘ (narrowly understood)8 to noting the importance of 
sustainable development as a principal objective,9 adapting both normatively and 
institutionally to support the global development agenda. Noting the importance of 
commodities in pursuing sustainable development, this shift necessarily entails 
engaging with commodities as a special class of goods and can be seen most 
explicitly in the WTO‘s involvement in the United Nation‘s ambitious 2030 
Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals.10 
 
This article proceeds as follows: Part II identifies the central role that trade in 
commodities plays in the pursuit of the SDGs. Part III sets out the fragmented 
system of commodities regulation in international law at the institutional as well as 
normative levels. Part IV takes the example of fisheries subsidies as an instance 
                                                        
6 See the discussions in J.H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or 
Conflict?, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO 414 (2000); S. JOSEPH, BLAME IT 
ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE (2011); J. STIGLITZ &A. CHARLTON, FAIR 
TRADE FOR ALL (2005); T. Pogge, Recognised and Violated: the Human Rights of the Global Poor, 
18 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 717 (2005); K. Conca, The WTO and the Undermining of Global 
Environmental Governance, 7 REV. INT‘L  POL. ECON. 3, 484 (2000); ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. 
& DEV., TRADE, EMPLOYMENT, AND LABOUR STANDARDS:  A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS‘ 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1996); WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION, THE 
FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 1-10 (2004). 
7 On the definition of commodities, see Final Act of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment, infra note 17 & corresponding text.  
8 ―The GATT 1994 is a commercial agreement, and the WTO is concerned, after all, with 
markets‖, Appellate Body Report, Japan— Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/ 
DS8/ AB/ R, WT/ DS10/ AB/ R, WT/ DS11/ AB/ R 25 (Nov. 1, 1996). 
9 Most explicitly noted in paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. World Trade Organisation, 
Ministerial Declaration of November 20 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC1.  
10 Specifically SDG 14.6, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, G.A. Res. 70/1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/70/1 (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter The 
2030 Agenda]. 
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where trade law is being used as the focus by the international community in 
seeking to achieve SDG 14.6, the goal which seeks to prohibit harmful fisheries 
subsidies. Part V concludes by drawing attention to the WTO‘s increasing role as a 
willing and self-interested part of the institutional framework for economic 
development and the profound shift in priorities that this marks for the WTO 
membership, from trade liberalisation narrowly construed as ‗trade and its trade 
effects‘ to one modelled on sustainable development and the effects of trade lato 
sensu. 
 
II. TRADE IN COMMODITIES AND THE UN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS 
A number of current challenges facing the international community, particularly in 
the pursuit of sustainable development, are intimately tied to trade and most 
notably trade in commodities. Note, for example, the role that the surge in food 
prices during the food crisis of 2007-08 played in sparking popular unrest across 
three continents, bringing the importance of food security into sharp relief.11 Or 
how the unprecedented economic growth changing the political landscape in some 
regions such as sub-Saharan Africa has been led in part by historically high 
commodity prices, such as of oil, and has subsequently risked throwing some of 
these ‗success‘ stories off-kilter as energy prices collapsed in 2014, and destabilised 
others such as Venezuela which are dependent on energy exports.12 Trade in 
commodities (such as wheat, rice, and oil) and their fluctuating prices have been 
common factors in these developments. 
 
This relationship is most notable when examined through the goals set out in the 
successor to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the United Nations‘ 
2030 Agenda. It sets out a number of targets (including indicators with which to 
measure their progress) – the Sustainable Development Goals. The SDGs have 
been designed to incorporate the lessons learnt from the experience of the MDGs 
which had developed organically over time. It was in the years following the 
original Millennium Declaration that details were added to their aims, means to 
measure their success were evolved, and financial support for their completion was 
clarified, whereas the 2030 Agenda includes from the beginning a detailed list of 
goals, their targets, and the means to assess their progress. 
 
                                                        
11  P. LAMY, THE GENEVA CONSENSUS: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR ALL 68-70 (2013). 
12 Compare Int‘l Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (2014), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014//eng/sreo0414.htm, and Regional 
Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (2016), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2016/afr/eng/sreo0416.htm.  
Winter, 2017]          Sustainable Development and the Commodities Challenge            58 
 
The SDGs are also ambitious from the start, with the 2030 Agenda boldly 
proclaiming: 
 
―We resolve, between now and 2030, to end poverty and hunger 
everywhere; to combat inequalities within and among countries; to 
build peaceful, just and inclusive societies; to protect human rights 
and promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and 
girls; and to ensure the lasting protection of the planet and its natural 
resources. We resolve also to create conditions for sustainable, 
inclusive and sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and 
decent work for all, taking into account different levels of national 
development and capacities.‖13 
 
Sustainable development is a deeply integrative concept.14 The success of the 2030 
Agenda and the SDGs requires concerted effort by diverse actors (international 
organisations, states, civil society and private enterprises), across economic, 
political, and environmental spheres of governance.15 However, achieving these 
goals necessitates awareness of how commodities underpin many of these 
challenges. While the SDGs make only passing reference to commodities in 
relation to two Goals,16 they are almost uniformly related to either historic or 
current trade in commodities. While the exact definition of a commodity is 
contested, here commodities are understood as primary materials, the treatment of 
which is necessary only for their extraction and marketing. This is in line with the 
Havana Charter definition: ―any product of farm, forest or fishery or any mineral, 
in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily 
required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade.‖17 
Trade in commodities has long been a topic of concern for international markets 
and governments, as the following examples demonstrate. 
 
For example, in the case of Goal 2 (―[e]nd hunger, achieve food security and 
improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture‖), the cyclical pattern of 
sowing and harvesting of agricultural commodities, such as wheat or rice, 
                                                        
13 Id. ¶ 3. 
14 On the integrative nature of sustainable development, see F. Ortino, Investment Treaties, 
Sustainable Development and Reasonableness Review: A Case Against Strict Proportionality Balancing, 
30 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 71, 83-87 (2017). 
15 If indeed we consider such spheres distinct rather than expressions of the ‗political‘ latu 
sensu. 
16 Goals 2, ―End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture‖ and 9, ―Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and 
sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation‖, The 2030 Agenda, supra note 10. 
17 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Nov. 21, 1947- 
Mar. 24, 1948, Havana Charter art. 56(1), U.N. Docs. E/Conf. 2/78 (Apr. 1948).  
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necessarily creates difficulties for food planning.18 Where agricultural commodities 
are traded, an increase in prices is customarily matched by an increase in 
production, which in turn leads to a glut as the ability to alter supply is often 
limited to seasons. Where demand consistently increases such patterns are not 
problematic, but where response to demand is slow, as is often the case in farming, 
agricultural exporters are subjected to considerable price volatility.19 If further 
complications are added– such as inconsistent weather conditions (exacerbated by 
climate change), limited success in public stockholding policies, and liberalising 
pressures from different regimes in international economic law (i.e. the transition 
towards a ―market-oriented agricultural trading system‖20)– the centrality of trade 
in commodities in food security policies becomes clear. The recent food crisis of 
2007-08 discussed above is one such example where a range of different factors led 
to a spike in food prices causing serious difficulties for consumers in least 
developed and developing countries.21 
 
Another example, Goal 5 (―[a]chieve gender equality and empower all women and 
girls‖) is closely related to commodities‘ trade in a wide number of States, 
particularly amongst developing countries. Note the gendered division of labour in 
textiles production, such as cotton, where women are traditionally restricted to 
tasks which overlap with other unpaid work at home. Where textiles industries 
develop, men often dominate management roles,22 limiting the benefits of 
increased employment for women (an issue that in some instances is exacerbated 
by age discrimination where only younger women are employed in textile 
                                                        
18 On the importance of domestic measures to compensate for or counter difficulties in 
liberalised trade in agriculture, see the examples in Food & Agr. Org., The State of Food 
Insecurity in the World 2015 33-35 (FAO, IFAD, WFP 2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-
i4646e.pdf. 
19 On the many difficulties relating to food price, see Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Price 
Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses (June 12, 2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf. 
20 Agreement on Agriculture, second recital, Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 410. 
21 Derivative markets may also play a role, though their effect is unclear. See China – Rare 
Earths and China – Raw Materials, infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
22 See generally the findings of INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE, WOMEN IN COTTON: 
RESULTS OF A GLOBAL SURVEY (2011), 
http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/Exporters/Sectors/Food_a
nd_agri_business/Cotton/AssetPDF/Women%20in%20cotton%20-
%209%2011%2011%20FINAL.pdf. This need not be the case where, as with food 
security, domestic measures can compensate for the negative impact of industrial 
developments; however, these are far from certain and not necessary to take part in the 
global value chains underpinning the world production of cotton. See also TRADE AND 
GENDER: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 149-50 
(Anh-Nga Tran-Nguyen & Americo Beviglia Zampetti eds., UNCTAD 2004). 
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factories).23 Further, Goal 4 (―[e]nsure inclusive and equitable quality education and 
promote lifelong learning opportunities for all‖)is also affected by the functioning 
of commodities sectors. Agricultural commodities which require intensive 
harvesting, for example, are customarily seasonal.24 They thus require work during 
long hours and are dependent on itinerant workers. Both these factors place 
barriers to children who seek access to quality education,25 either limiting their 
ability to attend school due to the long working hours or rendering them so tired 
from physical labour that their capacity to be educated is hampered. In each of 
these cases, the trade in that commodity and the development of the industry can 
have a serious impact on the educational opportunities for children and/or the 
position of women in the economy. These challenges can be met only by 
acknowledging that the nature of the commodity is linked to the difficulty faced: 
for example, the seasonal harvest of sugarcane or culturally embedded norms 
related to the expectation of women‘s roles in cotton-spinning.26 
 
The limitations in achieving sustainable development in the face of grave 
environmental challenges (Goals 6,27 14,28 and 1629) are similarly related to trade in 
commodities. Logging, for example, raises serious concerns for biodiversity and 
sustainable land management and is nonetheless essential for global timber trade 
(on which the economies of States may depend).30 Meanwhile, extractive industries 
are especially problematic as they often involve the use of hazardous chemicals for 
extraction and purification. The gold mining industry, for example, is heavily 
dependent on cyanide for the production process (whether wet or dry)31and on 
                                                        
23See the findings in JANE KORINEK, TRADE AND GENDER: ISSUES AND INTERACTIONS 15 
(OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 24, 2005), 
https://www.oecd.org/tad/35770606.pdf. 
24See, e.g., the impact of seasonal agricultural work on the education of child workers in 
Turkey. B. Gulcubuk, Child Labor Under the Worst Conditions: Child Laborers in Cotton Production 
in Turkey, 5(12) AFR. J. AGR. RES. 12, 1388-90 (2010). 
25 70% of child labourers work in the agricultural industry. See P. Hurst with Paola Termine 
& Marilee Karl, Agricultural Workers and Their Contribution to Sustainable Agriculture and Rural 
Development 27-29 (Food & Agr. Org., 2005), http://www.fao-
ilo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/fao_ilo/pdf/engl_agricultureC4163.pdf.  
26 On the systematic exclusion of women from the modernisation of agricultural sectors, see 
Tran-Nguyen & Zampetti, supra note 22, at 278. 
27 ―Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all‖. 
28 ―Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development‖. 
29 ―Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels‖. 
30 J. A. Tobias, Biodiversity: Hidden impacts of logging, 523 NATURE 163 (2015). 
31 See, e.g., S. Seck, Environmental Harm in Developing Countries Caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian 
Mining Corporations: The Interface of Public and Private International Law, 37 CANADIAN Y.B. OF 
INT‘L L. 139, 139-43 (1999). 
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mercury in small-scale extraction projects32.Thus, the dual nature of the commodity 
gives rise to challenges: high demand and slow cultivation time in the case of 
timber, and high demand and toxic extraction processes for gold. 
 
More structural issues facing the international community are no less influenced by 
trade in commodities. The pursuit of Goal 10 (―[r]educe inequality within and 
among countries‖) is linked to trade in commodities, both as a result of historical 
colonial relationships which coerced colonies into becoming specialised centres of 
resource extraction and the subsequent economic specialisation and dependency 
on such goods as a result of post-colonial economic policies.33 Such policies were 
further exacerbated by historically differential tariff treatment for manufactured 
goods and the varied effect of productivity gains across the globe.34 Cotton, for 
example, has played a key role in determining the structure of the global economic 
system.35 Global value chains where goods are manufactured across jurisdictions 
and the effect of specialisation and mechanisation are all part of the cotton 
industry‘s history.36 Most important is the role of the cotton industry in the ‗great 
divergence‘–the point at which the economies of India, China and Turkey (inter 
alia) diverged from their comparable equivalence with the economies of Western 
Europe.37 Levels of industrialisation diverged as harvesting remained necessarily in 
the fields while spinning and weaving moved to the industrial heartland of 
England. Early industrialisation in States such as India and Turkey was reversed, 
leaving a legacy of North-South relationships that is still felt today in spite of 
recent economic advances.38 The British Empire may have been ―built on a huge 
                                                        
32 Artisanal and small-scale gold miners have come under particular focus on the use of 
mercury as States seek to meet their obligations under the Minamata Convention on 
Mercury, Oct. 10, 2013, 27 U.N.T.S. 17, http://www.mercuryconvention.org. 
33 A. ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
263-68 (2004). See also the discussions in United Nations Conf. on Trade & Dev., 50 Years of 
Research and Policy Advice on Commodities and Development: The Role of UNCTAD, 
UNCTAD/WEB/SUC/2014/3 (Apr. 11, 2014). 
34 G. COREA, TAMING COMMODITY MARKETS: THE INTEGRATED PROGRAMME AND THE 
COMMON FUND IN UNCTAD 5 (1992). 
35 E. HOBSBAWM, INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE 34 (1999). 
36 See generally S. BECKERT, EMPIRES OF COTTON: A NEW HISTORY OF GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM (2014). 
37 Id. at 29-50. See also K. POMERANZ, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: CHINA, EUROPE, AND 
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY (2001). 
38 Note the distortions within the global cotton market, and the push to provide a 
subsequent Ministerial Decision on cotton at Nairobi in 2015. World Trade Organisation, 
Ministerial Declaration of 19 December 2015, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15)/46 WT/L/981 
(2015). For analysis of the processes involved in cotton negotiations at the WTO and their 
context, see M. EAGLETON-PIERCE, SYMBOLIC POWER IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION 84-120 (2012). 
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sugar, caffeine and nicotine rush‖39, but it was cotton that brought factories and 
centralised production.40 In the case of sugar and cotton, as well as other 
commodities such as coffee and tobacco, the relationship between commodities 
and State-sponsored imperial projects was central, still marking international 
relations and opportunities for cooperation.41 
 
Each of the Goals has at its core a necessary or substantial overlap with the 
international regulation of commodities (either as primary goods or as financial 
instruments). This exacerbates the challenges faced by individual States and the 
international community as they pursue the completion of the SDGs.  
 
Yet, in spite of trade in commodities being at the heart of the interlocking 
challenges confronted in the pursuit of sustainable development, the 2030 Agenda 
makes few references to their trade or regulation and the potential impact this may 
have on achieving sustainable development or pursuing the completion of the 
SDGs. Only Goals 2 (―[e]nd hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition 
and promote sustainable agriculture‖) and 9 (―[b]uild resilient infrastructure, 
promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation‖) contain 
explicit references to trade in commodities.  
 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW’S FRAGMENTED REGULATION OF COMMODITIES 
It should be of no surprise that the 2030 Agenda has not treated commodities‘ 
regulation in a coherent fashion; after all, the regulation of commodities is at best a 
wildly fragmented sub-system in international law. Competing interests and 
systemic biases of different legal regimes have created tensions for their effective 
regulation. World trade law, international environmental law, energy law, 
international financial law and the law of the sea all play a role, and yet, they 
approach the challenges of commodities‘ trade in radically different ways, indeed, 
conceptualising the challenges themselves differently.42 
 
For some systems such as trade law, the externalities associated with trade in 
commodities can be seen as unfortunate side-effects of an otherwise effective 
regime (counterpoising their regulation with the development-minded economic 
                                                        
39 N. FERGUSON, EMPIRE: HOW BRITAIN MADE THE MODERN WORLD 15 (2004). 
40 See BECKERT, supra note 36, at xvii-xix & 56-57.  
41 On how European economic development is dependent upon overseas trade, see K. 
POMERANZ, supra note 37, at 4-7. For a compelling analysis of the institutional legacies of 
sugar on the world trade system, see M. FAKHRI, SUGAR AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (2014). 
42 Indeed, within systems, variations of conceptualisation exist. Note, for example, the 
account given in F. SMITH, AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO, ch. 2 (2009).  
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policies of the 1950s to mid-1970s which sought to either restrict imports so as to 
encourage domestic production or stabilise their prices through the use of buffer 
stocks, subsidies, or export and import restraints).43 Price fluctuations in 
commodities have been a concern in trade law since the 1920s, when they were 
seen as a sufficiently serious problem during the inter-War period to constitute a 
key issue at Bretton Woods. Sensitive to the disorder caused by price fluctuations 
during times of war, the negotiators sought to regulate the use of international 
commodity agreements (ICAs) comprehensively under the Havana Charter.44 Yet, 
trade law‘s ability to regulate commodities comprehensively was scuppered by the 
Havana Charter‘s demise, and the GATT 1947 served as a poor relative, with the 
provisions of Art XI on permissible restrictions and Art XVI on the use of 
subsidies relating to ‗primary products‘ only.45 
 
In trade circles, commodities increasingly became connected to development 
concerns as it was developing countries that were most dependent on their export 
and were hampered by a lack of resources from enabling diversification within 
their economies and thus minimising the impact of price fluctuations. Focus 
moved to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and as part of the wider movement for a New International Economic Order,46 
there was nominal interaction with the GATT framework.47 International 
commodity agreements, which sought to minimise price fluctuations, largely failed 
(or so the narrative goes),48 and their failure became linked to the wider 
oppositional relationship between development studies and neoliberal economics, 
the UNCTAD and the GATT, and import-substitution policies and the 
                                                        
43 For a more detailed account in the context of trade law, see M. Trebilcock, Between 
Theories of Trade and Development: The Future of the World Trading System, 16 J. WORLD INV. & 
TRADE 122 (2015); M. Fakhri, supra note 41, at 173-208. 
44 See Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment, State Department 
Publication No. 2411, Dec. 1945, in D. IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 244-61 
(2009), in particular note at 249- ―Release From Fear of Disorder in the Markets for 
Primary Commodities‖ as a core element in encouraging trade. 
45 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
46 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. S-
6/3201, U.N. Doc. A/Res/ (May 1, 1974). 
47 S. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO 69 (2012). See also Working Party on 
Commodity Problems, Brief Notes on the General Discussion at the Second and Third 
Meetings Spec 274/55 (Sept. 3, 1955), for the UK‘s (amongst others) insistence that any 
new multilateral agreement on commodities be closely linked to the GATT system. 
48 For the view that commodity agreements had been ineffective and that trade distortive 
measures were at the root of the problem in agricultural trade, see Note by the Secretariat, 
Summary of Studies on Problems Affecting Trade in Agriculture and Their Causes 
MTN.GNG/NG5/W/3 (Mar. 31, 1987). For a more comprehensive and nuanced account 
against this, see M. FAKHRI, supra note 41, at 173-200. 
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Washington Consensus.49 The accuracy of the narrative is clearly dubious as other 
important factors (such as a lack of financial commitment on the part of States) 
played an important role; yet, the narrative is a powerful one.50 ICAs could be 
viewed as unsuccessful because they sought to regulate a market that would work 
best without intervention, an account that fit in with the ascendant neoliberal trend 
in trade theory at the time.51 Trade law subsequently treated commodities like all 
other goods, with special treatment given inconsistently and without logical 
underpinnings. Agriculture was to have its own trade regime; oil was excluded for a 
number of key exporters (OPEC); yet, copper was to be traded like anything else. 
It is notable that there are no equivalent commodity provisions under the GATS as 
under the GATT because by the time of the Uruguay Round the movement away 
from seeing ICAs as a solution for commodity price instability was complete.52 As 
a result, trade law‘s view of the negative effects of trade in commodities was that it 
was a problem to be managed but with no clear mandate or appreciation of how to 
tackle these challenges and with only minor concessions made on food security, 
public stockholding, cotton, and agricultural export subsidies.53 Further, the 
obligations within the system impose differing disciplines over imports and 
exports. Save for explicit commitments (either scheduled or through their 
accession protocols), WTO members have far fewer obligations with regard to 
exports than imports thus restricting the ability of non-commodity-producing 
members to influence the price of commodities through import restraints.54 
 
For financial markets, trade in commodities offers opportunities not only for 
investors but also for producers. Futures markets can be used as early warning 
systems, indicating potential situations of over-supply or unmet demand. Yet, 
public perception links ‗speculation‘ with increased volatility in food prices, 
                                                        
49 The ideological shift in the 1980s went hand in hand with reduced commodity prices that 
benefited developed rather than developing States. G. COREA, supra note 34, at 181. 
50 See, e.g., supra note 48. 
51 See A. LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM 232-38 (2011). 
52 See also the Agreement on Agriculture‘s commitment to a market-oriented system, supra 
note 20. 
53 See World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Conference, Public Stockholding for Food 
Security Purposes, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/38 WT/L/913 
(2013); World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Conference, Export Competition, Ministerial 
Decision of 19 December 2015, WT/MIN(15)/45 WT/L/980 (2015); World Trade 
Organisation, Ministerial Conference, Cotton, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, 
WT/MIN(15)/46 WT/L/981 (2015); World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Conference, 
Special Safeguard Mechanism for Developing Country Members, Ministerial Decision of 19 
December 2015, WT/MIN(15)/43 WT/L/978 (2015). 
54 The China litigation on this point is most telling, for which see Panel Report, China – Rare 
Earths, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/R/Add.1, (Mar. 26, 2014) and Panel Report, China – Raw 
Materials WTO Doc. WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (Jul. 5, 2011).  
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encouraging policy makers in affected areas to respond through a variety of 
measures such as subsidies or regulatory investigation.55 New international 
instruments that may have an effect on this dynamic (such as MiFID II or Dodd 
Frank) also do not appear to correct the concerns of civil society and food 
vulnerable States.56 
 
For other regimes, such as international environmental law, trade in commodities 
itself is not the problem, but rather the attendant negative consequences for 
biodiversity such as farmers specialising in limited cash crops,57 or for 
environmental protection as extractive industries (for example) cause potential 
harm to the ecosystem.58 Of course, possible government intervention in 
protecting such interests may well find itself in tension with international investors 
who may feel that such acts are not pursued in public interest, but rather constitute 
violations of fair and equitable treatment, or entail a form of indirect 
expropriation.59 Here, international investment law may act as a counterpoint, not 
especially concerned with commodity trade per se but still engaged as the subject-
matter of a number of disputes which arise from existing and putative obligations 
under international investment law is commodity-based.60 
 
Commodities are explicitly examined by a number of institutions, yet they form a 
patchwork of competing perspectives rather than a coherent network. The Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) takes particular interest in this regard, 
principally through its Committee on Commodity Problems.61 The UNCTAD has 
a specific Division of International Trade and Commodities (DITC) under which it 
                                                        
55 See the discussion in Office of the United Nations High Cmm‘r for Human Rights, O. de 
Schutter, Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises: Regulation to reduce the 
risks of price volatility, Briefing Note 2 (Sept. 2010), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/Briefing_Note_02_September_2010_
EN.pdf. 
56 A. Chadwick, Regulating Excessive Speculation: Commodity Derivatives and the Global Food Crisis, 
66 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 625, 625-54, (2017). 
57 E.g., Tobias, supra note 30 and corresponding text. 
58 P. SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 548 (3d ed. 
2012). 
59 E.g., Glamis Gold Ltd v. USA, Award (June 8, 2009).  
60 The expectation that investments be taken for a ‗certain duration‘ lend themselves to 
focussing on commodities where extraction or harvest can take years before profitable 
returns are met. Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 43 (July 11, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1378. 
61 Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organisation art. V(6)(b), C.T.S. 1945/32, 40 
A.J.I.L. Supp. 76. It is the FAO that has pushed for the amendments to the HS 
Nomenclature 2017 Edition relating to food security (which constitute the majority of 
changes). 
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has established a Special Unit on Commodities.62 At a more general level, the 
UNCTAD also established the Global Commodities Forum in 2010, and more 
recently in 2014, the Working Group on Commodities Governance.  The 
Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) functions as a specialised development 
agency, financing commodity projects in developing States.63 The remit of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food similarly involves questioning the 
regulation of commodities in international relations.64 A number of ICAs still exist, 
covering cocoa, coffee, cotton, grains, olive oil, sugar, and tropical 
timber.65However, they no longer attempt to stabilise prices as had previously been 
the case. Instead, they function as forums where producers and consumers can 
engage, identifying issues and coordinating policies.66 An increasing number of 
non-State actors are also involved, such as the International Council on Mining and 
Metals, which sets guidelines and distributes good practices for mining industries, 
or the Marine Stewardship Council which sets (private) standards and provides 
certification to promote sustainable use of fish stocks. 
 
Aside from diversity in legal regimes the regulation of commodities differs in 
objectives, with each regime perceiving the concerns that commodities raise 
differently. They may be seen as essential goods required for current models of 
economic growth (the position of the EU in its Critical Raw Materials initiative),67 
or as sources of instability (as seen in the development policy and ICA 
discussions), or as challenges to be resolved per se (the concerns relating to 
normative fragmentation between legal regimes such as trade and the 
environment). Competing conceptions of how commodities are examined have an 
impact on the architecture of the legal regime, which subsequently encourages 
regulatory divergence among regimes. 
 
The logic and legal structure of the regulation of commodities is diverse at best, 
inconsistent at worst.68 Does such a lack of coherence over a fundamental issue in 
sustainable development paint a bleak picture for pursuing the goals of the 2030 
Agenda? This would appear to be an example par excellence of both institutional and 
normative fragmentation within international law, with no coherent legal regime 
managing trade in commodities nor, therefore, the achievement of the SDGs.  
                                                        
62 Accra Accord, UNCTAD XII, ¶ 183, UNCTAD/IAOS/2008/2 (Apr. 25, 2008). 
63 Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, 1980, 1538 U.N.T.S. 3. 
64 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Addendum: Mission to the 
World Trade Organisation, A/HRC/10/5/Add.2 (Feb. 4, 2009). 
65 There also exist a number of International Study Groups which serve a similar purpose. 
P. MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS 351 (2d ed. 2012). 
66 Id. 
67 See Report of the EU Ad hoc Working Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials, Report 
on Critical Raw Materials for the EU (May 2014). 
68Supra note 57 and corresponding text. 
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Confronting the underlying inconsistency in commodities regulation is essential for 
the international community to achieve the goals set out in the 2030 Agenda and 
sustainable development more generally. Yet, while such inconsistency presents a 
great deal of challenges to the completion of the 2030 Agenda, there are 
commonalities in approaches to commodity regulation that suggest areas where 
common ground might be found. 
 
Some common measures have been proposed to assuage issues across regulatory 
areas. For example, in the case of commodities as financial instruments, in food 
markets, information asymmetry within the primary market (i.e. between producers 
and consumers of the primary good in question) is considered to be a problem that 
these derivatives may aid in rectifying (underlying this assumption is the concern 
relating to a lack of data between producers and consumers creating price 
fluctuations in agricultural commodities such as coffee or sugar).69 
 
Within regulatory regimes as diverse as human rights, trade, and the environment 
(amongst others), transparency obligations in the form of notifications play an 
important role in attempting to resolve information gaps or data asymmetries. 
Indeed, the common current form of ICAs is one where stakeholders (both 
importers and exporters) share a forum so as to more effectively share 
information.70 At the WTO, transparency obligations come in a number of forms: 
the creation of national enquiry points,71 the requirement to notify measures to the 
relevant WTO committee,72 or the need to publish relevant rules or regulations in 
an official WTO language (i.e. English, Spanish, and French).73 In fisheries, which 
will be examined in greater detail in the following section, the lack of information 
on subsidies which may contribute to overfishing presents such a challenge.74 
                                                        
69 See, e.g., supra note 55 and corresponding text. 
70 See K.U.R. KHAN, THE LAW AND ORGANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY 
AGREEMENTS (1982). 
71 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 10.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter 
TBT Agreement]; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].   
72 These vary but are frequently used in a number of areas. Note the TBT Information 
Management System has currently logged 21473 regular notifications, 
http://tbtims.wto.org, while the SPS Information Management System has logged 7676, 
http://spsims.wto.org. 
73 See e.g., Accession of the People‘s Republic of China, Decision of 10 November 2001, 
WTO Doc. WT/L/ 432 8 (Nov. 2001). 
74 This has been recognised by UNCTAD, the FAO and the UNEP. See UNCTAD, FAO 
& UNEP, Joint Statement, Regulating Fisheries Subsidies Must be an Integral Part of the 
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Indeed, more broadly, the move to sustainability in primary goods requires a multi-
faceted mix of actors and actions to be pursued, which necessarily entails providing 
appropriate information to all parties concerned.75 
 
The appeal to information gathering and transparency may well be seen as a weak 
attempt to manage systemic fragmentation; however, current practice in the realm 
of fisheries subsidies tells a different story. The following section identifies how, in 
pursuing the achievement of SDG 14, States and international organisations have 
turned to a strategy of instrumentalisation of the diversity of systems of rules and 
expertise, building on common techniques of (1) rule elaboration in regional and 
multilateral forums, and (2) information gathering, thereby maximising the 
strengths of institutional actors such as the World Trade Organisation. By 
identifying one comparative strength (the WTO as a nexus for information 
gathering), international actors have been able to ‗ratchet‘ efforts towards specific 
legal disciplines on the use of subsidies.  
 
IV. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND THE SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
The WTO is identified in the 2030 Agenda, not as an actor which is to meet 
obligations, but as a forum or site of activity where States are able to pursue the 
SDGs. Thus, it is through the WTO that progress is to be made in improving access 
to medicines, reducing inequality between developing and developed members, 
including duty and quota free access for least-developed countries (LDCs), and 
eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies.76 This shift in identifying the WTO not 
only as institutional actor but also as a forum, allows for an approach to inter-
institutional relations that does not focus on conflicting or competing regimes, but 
on identifying the constituent actors as responsible for meeting the SDGs. 
Nonetheless, the ideological and epistemic underpinnings of the organisation 
cannot be excluded so easily,77 and the WTO has long been viewed and even 
viewed itself as first-and-foremost a trade body.78 In this section, the development 
of a nascent fisheries policy in trade law institutions is analysed, noting the recent 
increase in attention at the WTO and the possibility that meaningful progress be 
                                                                                                                                        
Implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, ¶ 6.1 (July 20, 2016), 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/U14ditc_d16_FishSub_Statement_e
n.pdf.  
75FOOD & AGR. ORG., BUILDING A COMMON VISION FOR SUSTAINABLE FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE 36-38 (2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3940e.pdf. 
76 The 2030 Agenda, supra note 10, ¶¶ 3b, 10a, 17.12, & 14.6 respectively.  
77 See G. MESSENGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION LAW: 
EXAMINING CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-58 (2016). 
78 See the discussions in note 6 for an evocative set of examples. 
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made on what is a ‗trade matter‘ in only the broadest sense. The subsidisation of 
fisheries (through the subsidisation of fishing) is an interesting example exactly 
because it is a trade issue only if one takes a holistic view of trade as proposed 
above, acknowledging that commodities‘ trade has multiple effects on labour, 
economic development, the environment, and resource utilisation. The impact of 
fishing subsidies on stocks is also a matter of pressing importance for the 
international community and has long been recognised as a topic in need of 
attention.79 That it should receive such attention now, and at the WTO, is a 
noteworthy development that indicates a broader shift in trade law‘s place in the 
international system. 
A. Fisheries Regulation and the 2030 Agenda 
The subsidisation of fisheries affects a number of different regimes and raises 
specific concerns for the 2030 Agenda. Fisheries subsidies are specifically referred 
to under SDG 14 (―Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine 
resources for sustainable development‖) which instructs:  
 
―By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which 
contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that 
contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain 
from introducing new such subsidies, recognising that appropriate 
and effective special and differential treatment for developing and 
least developed countries should be an integral part of the World 
Trade Organisation fisheries subsidies negotiation.‖80 
 
As identified by the Agenda, the principal worry for interest groups is that 
subsidisation of the fisheries industry might encourage the overuse of fish stocks 
and/or contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.  
 
The picture is, however, a nuanced one. Fisheries subsidies can take a number of 
forms, like income support for fishermen, fuel subsidies, fishing boat purchases, 
support for downstream industries within the processing or sales sectors, and the 
provision of new nets or other equipment.81 The principal concern from the 
perspective of SDG 14 is that by supporting fishing industries (whether on the 
                                                        
79 See WORLD BANK & FOOD & AGR. ORG., THE SUNKEN BILLIONS: THE ECONOMIC 
JUSTIFICATION FOR FISHERIES REFORM (World Bank 2009). 
80 SDG 14.6, The 2030 Agenda, supra note 10. Other specific targets are set under Goal 14, 
but the focus here is on 14.6 and fisheries subsidies.  
81 Commonly fisheries subsidies are divided into beneficial, capacity-enhancing, and 
ambiguous. See G. Munro & U.R. Sumaila, The Impact of Subsidies upon Fisheries Management 
and Sustainability: The case of the North Atlantic, 3 FISH & FISHERIES 233 (2002). 
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high seas, on territorial waters or inland), subsidies increase capacity and thus 
encourage overfishing82 which in turn can have a dramatic impact on the 
sustainability of fish stocks and diversity in the ecosystem.83 While some subsidies 
encourage the farming of fish, which may have negative consequences for wider 
fish stocks, many others encourage sustainable fishing through the provision of 
more advanced boats, shoal detection equipment, or nets.84 Further, the interests in 
protecting fish stocks may well run against other competing interests such as 
protecting local communities from economic deprivation, guarding indigenous 
communities‘ pursuit of traditional practices, or promoting food security.85 
 
Nor is it clear whether fisheries subsidies have a meaningful trade impact in the 
narrow sense. Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures(SCM Agreement),86 to challenge a subsidy directly through dispute 
settlement, or to have recourse to a self-help remedy in the form of a 
countervailing duty, the subsidy must either be prohibited (that is, the most 
harmful type of subsidy from a trade perspective, those contingent on export 
performance or use of local content),87 or it must be demonstrated that the subsidy 
causes an adverse effect (in direct challenges) or causes material injury (in the case 
of direct challenges or countervailing duties).88 In each case, the impact of 
subsidies is principally measured through the harm caused to the industry.89 
However, fisheries subsidies are not considered harmful only when injuring other 
industries and they need not be intended for export.90 Indeed, many fisheries 
industries are not targeted toward exports, but rather internal consumption.91 
                                                        
82 This assumption is challenged strongly by some members such as the Republic of Korea.  
83 See Eur. Parl., Directorate Gen. for Internal Policies, Note, Global Fisheries Subsidies 
(2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/513978/IPOL-
PECH_NT(2013)513978_EN.pdf. 
84 Acknowledged in supra note 67, ¶ 3. Note, this does not mean that there are no other 
problems: the feed used for the fish during the farming process may well come from 
unsustainable fish source, while questions exist over the potential health impacts of 
intensively farmed fish. 
85See J. He, Chinese Public Policy on Fisheries Subsidies: Reconciling Trade, Environmental and Food 
Security Stakes, 56 MARINE POL‘Y 106 (2015). 
86 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement].  
87 SCM Agreement, supra note 86 art. 3.1. 
88 SCM Agreement, supra note 86 arts. 5 & 11.2. 
89See Art. 15 SCM Agreement. 
90 See supra note 79. 
91 See the questions raised in S.W. Chang, WTO Disciplines on Fisheries Subsidies: A Historic 
Step Towards Sustainability?, 6 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 4, 879 (2003); Y. Chou & C.S. Ou, The 
Opportunity to Regulate Domestic Fishery Subsidies Through International Agreements, 63 MARINE 
POL‘Y 118 (2016).  
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Instead, the harm that fisheries subsidies cause may be of a kind foreseen by the 
SCM Agreement but the principal concern is the harm that such subsidies cause 
for the resource upon which fishing industries depend, i.e., the depletion of shared 
resources.92 While it could be possible to calculate the value of the subsidy in 
question, it would be harder (though not impossible) to calculate the harm caused 
to the fish stocks by the subsidy.93 This problem is compounded by the limited 
number of empirical studies on the contribution of fisheries subsidies to the fishing 
practices contemplated under SDG 14.6, and the current value of fisheries 
subsidies or how they are best to be calculated.94 An endemic lack of transparency 
in the provision of such subsidies by governments exacerbates this difficulty.95 
Thus, a second challenge is raised by fisheries subsidies: if they are a problem, but 
cause little disruption to trade, is the WTO the appropriate forum to tackle them? 
 
The maintenance of fish stocks and responsible use of maritime resources is 
already the focus of a number of different international organisations.96 For 
instance, regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) form a complex 
network of actors that cover geographic regions (such as the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission) or are subject-specific within a region, such as the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission. Most are not strictly regional in the sense of 
membership but in the area of interest, thus ensuring that States with fishing 
interests in those regions are also present. They are the ‗cornerstone‘ of fisheries 
management, with many having important powers for pursuing the conservation 
and management of fish stocks, including designating total allowable catches, 
monitoring vessels, and sharing information and data, amongst others.97 A key 
limitation of such bodies, aside from predictable issues arising from a lack of 
                                                        
92 Alice V. Tipping, A ―Clean Sheet‖ Approach to Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines 8 (ICTSD 
2015), http://e15initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/E15_Subsidies_Tipping_final.pdf.  
93See L. BARTELS & T. MORGANDI, OPTIONS FOR THE LEGAL FORM OF A WTO 
AGREEMENT ON FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 4 (ICTSD Nov. 2017), 
https://www.ictsd.org/themes/environment/research/options-for-the-legal-form-of-a-
wto-agreement-on-fisheries-subsidies. 
94 For discussion on this point, see U.R. Sumaila et al., Global fisheries subsidies: An Updated 
Estimate, MARINE POL‘Y (2016). A notable exception is the ‗Sunken Billions‘ report of the 
World Bank and the FAO in 2009 and the ‗Sunken Billions Revisited‘ report of the World 
Bank in 2017.  
95 In part due to a lack of compliance with existing notification obligations. C-J Chen, 
Fisheries Subsidies under International Law 6-7 (2010). See further infra note 175 and 
accompanying text. 
96 For a clear and concise overview, see M.A. Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction 
between Regimes in International Law, ch. 2 (2011). 
97 Food & Agr. Org., Report: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 69 (2008). 
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political will or resources, is their limited ability to affect management policies on 
the high seas.98 
 
RFMOs are only one set of bodies within the fisheries management network, 
existing as part of a wider UN network, where States are instructed to create 
further regional bodies where necessary.99 These different UN bodies play a role, 
not only alongside RFMOs but also independently. The FAO, the UNEP and the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) are all 
participants in fisheries management and also contribute to the legal network of 
treaties and codes that seek to help conserve and manage fish stocks.100 
 
More recently, three key agencies have coordinated efforts to encourage movement 
on the issue of fisheries subsidies. In July 2016, UNCTAD, the FAO, and the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) released a joint statement 
building on the ‗momentum‘ of the SDGs (in particular SDG 14), to encourage 
progress in trade negotiations and declare themselves ―ready to support Members 
States in achieving policy coherence and provide capacity building and technical 
assistance‖ in pursuing SDG 14.101 
 
Other less obvious participants also play a role, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has been active in 
determining the scale and scope of the overlap between fisheries conservation and 
management and the prevalence of subsidies in the fisheries sector.102 It is here that 
the clear role for non-environmental or law of the sea bodies becomes contentious. 
While there is a pressing need to regulate fishing to ensure equitable and 
sustainable use of stocks, it is not clear whether fisheries subsidies which may 
contribute to overfishing or IUU fishing have a trade impact of the kind 
customarily covered by world trade law.103 Yet, the hope of many is, at least in part, 
focused on results at the WTO.104 
                                                        
98 On the challenges faced in tuna, see Food & Agr. Org., I Performance Reviews by 
Regional Fishery Bodies: Introduction, Summaries, Synthesis and Best Practices 26 (2012). 
99 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 118, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
100 See, e.g., UNCLOS, 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, 1992 UNCED Agenda 21, 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, 2009 
FAO Agreement on Port State Measures. 
101 UNCTAD-FAO-UNEP Joint statement, supra note 74, ¶ 6. 
102 See generally the work of the OECD Fisheries Division, for example, A. COX & C-C. 
SCHMIDT, OECD DIRECTORATE OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND FISHERIES, SUBSIDIES IN 
THE OECD FISHERIES SECTOR: A REVIEW OF RECENT ANALYSIS AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS, http://www.oecd.org/tad/fisheries/2507604.pdf. 
103 Supra note 7891. 
104 UNCTAD-FAO-UNEP Joint statement, supra note 74, ¶ 5. 
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B. Pursuing Sustainable Fisheries through the Trade Regime: Multilateral to Regional and 
Back Again. 
In the pursuit of SDG 14 and specifically target 14.6 (the prohibition of ―certain 
forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and 
eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing‖), debates over how to proceed 
invariably involve questions over the appropriate forum and method. From an 
environmental perspective, such subsidies could hinder the pursuit of sustainability 
of fish stocks or increase welfare amongst fishing communities and their attendant 
economies, increasing their ability to fish sustainably, while from a trade 
perspective the principal concern is the need to guard against the adverse trade 
effects of such subsidies on competing fishermen (if indeed they exist).105 Thus, 
just as with the example of mining and the competing interests of investment law 
and environmental law, trade law and environmental or maritime law might view 
fisheries subsidies differently as well.106 
 
There exists a common thread underpinning these discussions on fisheries and 
other commodities identified earlier: the complexity of problems, the difficulties in 
identifying responses, and the fragmented regulatory space in which responses can 
be formulated.107 This can be noted in the language of the 2030 Agenda itself, 
which makes continued references to the need for coordination, coherence, and 
communication.108It is here that the WTO has a particular strength: while it is 
noted for its set of primary rules and dispute settlement, it is also highly adept at 
developing systems of transparency and notifications.109 
 
Until recently the state of negotiations at the WTO on fisheries subsidies did not 
appear particularly hopeful. What follows is a brief account of the development of 
the negotiations at the WTO, from 2001 to 2018, highlighting the difficulties faced 
and also the advances that have been made in this process of cross-jurisdictional 
and collaborative rule elaboration. 
 
                                                        
105 Such questions are not new. World Bank Technical Paper No. 406, Milazzo, Subsidies in 
World Fisheries: A Re-examination (1998). 
106Supra note 57 and corresponding text. 
107 Note, fish as a commodity, Havana Charter 1947, supra note 17 art. 56.1 (―For the 
purposes of this Charter, the term "primary commodity" means any product of  farm, 
forest or fishery or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing 
as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international 
trade.‖) (emphasis added). 
108 The 2030 Agenda, supra note 10, ¶¶ 17.13-19. 
109 See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
Winter, 2017]          Sustainable Development and the Commodities Challenge            74 
 
Slow progress has been made since the original mandate in the Doha Declaration 
in 2001,110 in large part as a result of the requirement that all subjects of 
negotiation be dealt with together (that is, lack of agreement on one topic holds 
back agreement on all others). Nonetheless, in an attempt to move discussions 
forward, a draft text was proposed in 2007 by the chair of the Negotiating Group 
on Rules (the Chair). It served as the central point of discussion.111 It sought to 
prohibit subsidies for the following purposes subject to a set of exceptions: vessel 
acquisition, construction, repair or other modifications, transfer of vessels to a 
third country (for example forms of vessel buyback programs where the excess 
capacity is exported instead of being scrapped), support on operating costs (for 
example fuel and license fees) of fishing and land-based processing activities, port 
infrastructure exclusively or predominantly for fisheries activities, income support, 
price support, and acquisition of fishing access to foreign waters.112 A number of 
concerns were raised at the time and subsequently relating to: the scope of the 
special and differential treatment (S&DT) provisions for developing members with 
smaller fisheries industries, the possibility of de minimis exceptions, and the role of 
fisheries management systems.113 As a result, progress was slow and held back by 
the need to agree on all Doha mandated topics at the Negotiating Group on Rules 
(reform of the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements, clarification and 
improvement of rules on regional trade agreements, and disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies) following the WTO tradition of the single undertaking where ―nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed‖.114 Subsequently, work continued at the other 
fisheries bodies (UNCTAD, the FAO, and so on) and yet, at the WTO, advances 
grounded to a halt until recently.  
 
In May 2016, spurred by the adoption of the 2030 Agenda in September of the 
previous year during an informal meeting of the Negotiating Group on Rules, 
WTO Members indicated willingness to move forward on the topic (albeit still held 
                                                        
110 Fisheries are discussed in a number of areas, from subsidies to trade and the 
environment.  
111 See Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements, Negotiating 
Group on Rules, Annex VIII, TN/RL/W/213, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rules_chair_text_nov07_e.htm  (Nov. 
30, 2007) [hereinafter Draft Consolidated Chair Texts]. 
112Id. art. I.I.1. 
113 See Submission by India, Indonesia and China, Need for Effective Special and 
Differential Treatment for Developing Country Members in the Proposed Fisheries 
Subsidies Text, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/155/Rev.1 (2008); Communication from 
Brazil, China, India and Mexico, ―Fisheries subsidies - special and differential treatment‖, 
TN/RL/GEN/163(2010); Communication from Canada, Fisheries subsidies – Article II de 
minimis Exemption, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/156/Rev.1 (2011). 
114 Doha Declaration, supra note 9, ¶¶ 28-29. 
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back by related issues under attention, being held as bargaining chips by others).115 
It is telling that this move was not to propose a new text; instead, New Zealand‘s 
proposal was to gather information through ―a series of questions with a view to 
sharing information on such developments as a background for further discussions 
on fisheries subsidies disciplines.‖116 This seemed a modest step forward, though in 
keeping with the trend toward information collection identified above. While 
negotiations at the WTO moved slowly, they were to advance dramatically 
elsewhere,117 in part inspired by movement at the regional level, where the parties 
to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) had four months earlier agreed on a text 
including disciplines on fisheries subsidies. 
 
In keeping with the common practice of the WTO over the last 20 years, a lack of 
agreement at the multilateral level was compensated for by activity at the regional 
level. The negotiating parties of the TPP118 included a limitation on fisheries 
subsidies within the agreement, which specifically provided:  
 
―…no Party shall grant or maintain any of the following subsidies 
within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement that are 
specific within the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement:  
(a) subsidies for fishing that negatively affect fish stocks that are in 
an overfished condition; and 
(b) subsidies provided to any fishing vessel while listed by the flag 
State or a relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
or Arrangement for IUU fishing in accordance with the rules and 
procedures of that organisation or arrangement and in 
conformity with international law.‖119 
 
It is noteworthy that while the TPP draft prohibits subsidies which contribute to 
IUU fishing or negatively affect overfished stocks, it also places great focus on 
notification and data collection as part of a wider fisheries management network. It 
stresses the importance of ensuring effective fisheries management ―based on the 
                                                        
115 2016 News Items, World Trade Organisation, WTO members affirm interest in new 
international fisheries subsidies rules, but differ on way forward (June 29, 2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/rule_06jul16_e.htm. 
116 World Trade Organisation Communication, Negotiating Group on Rules, Identifying 
the WTO Contribution to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Fisheries 
Subsidies Questions, WTO Doc. TN/RLW/272 (May 24, 2016). 
117 See infra note 126 and corresponding text. 
118 At the time, the expected membership included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. 
119 Trans-Pacific Partnership, Feb. 4, 2016, art. 20.16(5), https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [hereinafter 
TPP].  
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best scientific evidence available and on internationally recognised best practices 
for fisheries management‖ which includes FAO guidance.120 The TPP draft also 
specifically instructs parties to ensure that catch data, fleet capacity, status of 
stocks, and that total imports and exports are included in their notifications of 
prohibited fisheries subsidies,121 while non-prohibited subsidies are still to be 
notified ―to the extent possible‖ including ―information in relation to other 
fisheries subsidies that the Party grants or maintains… in particular fuel 
subsidies.‖122It is noteworthy that the recently revised version of the treaty text 
(sans the United States) under the name Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) has maintained the provisions 
on fisheries subsidies.123 While such a move would have a significant impact, the 
CPTPP‘s future is still unclear, and its scope (though wide) is regional.124 
 
Nonetheless, a number of CPTPP parties (and some others) have moved to begin 
negotiations to ban fisheries subsidies along the lines of the original TPP draft. 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, Uruguay, and the United States have begun 
to prepare negotiations ―to work with each other and with like-minded participants 
to conclude an ambitious, high standard agreement, while at the same time working 
with all WTO Members to make progress toward a multilateral agreement in the 
WTO‖.125 What comes of the discussions will be important, though the absence of 
China, Japan, and the EU is troubling given their high impact on fisheries.126 
 
In response, the EU has become especially active at the WTO, seeking to prohibit 
harmful fisheries subsidies, in part building on its Common Fisheries Policy as a 
model to eliminate subsidies that increase capacity or support IUU fishing.127 The 
                                                        
120See TPP, supra note 119 art. 20.16(3).   
121See TPP, supra note 119 art. 20.16(10). 
122See TPP, supra note 119 art. 20.16(11). 
123 A list of the suspended provisions from the TPP text are available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/annex2-annexe2.aspx?lang=eng. 
124 With the USA‘s notification that it does not intend to become a member, at the time of 
writing the assumption is that the remaining ‗TPP 11‘ will move ahead amongst themselves 
to conclude the CPTPP. 
125 Joint Statement Regarding Fisheries Subsidies, Washington DC (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/09142016_STATEMENT_joint_statement_fisheries_
partners_FINAL.pdf. 
126 See Group of WTO Members Announces Talks to Ban Harmful Fisheries Subsidies, ICTSD 
BRIDGES (Sept. 22, 2016) http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/group-of-
wto-members-announces-talks-to-ban-harmful-fisheries-subsidies.  
127 C. Malmström, Protecting global fisheries through the WTO, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
BLOG (Oct.17, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-
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EU proposal, first circulated on October 18, 2016,128 and subsequently revised,129 
has offered suggestions that target Goal 14.6 closely and with the wider special and 
differential treatment obligations closely integrated. Clearly, the first EU proposal 
was merely a new ‗starting point‘ and it was responded to carefully by a number of 
groups, most notably: New Zealand, Iceland, and Pakistan; Argentina, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay; the ACP group; and the LDC group. 
Individual members also introduced proposals subsequently, including Indonesia, 
the US, and China.130 These specific proposals are discussed in the following 
section, though at this stage it is important to note the trajectory of the talks on 
fisheries subsidies, across jurisdictional boundaries. 
 
The renewed involvement of the EU, New Zealand, and a number of other TPP 
parties (along with international organisations such as the UNCTAD and the 
FAO) has once again placed fisheries subsidies firmly on the agenda at the WTO. 
There has been an explicit attempt to decouple fisheries from other contentious 
issues examined by the Negotiating Group on Rules, and there is now increased 
hope that the WTO will be in a position to offer an outcome at its 12th Ministerial 
Conference at the end of 2019. While there was hope that a package could be 
agreed upon at the 11th Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017, 
there has been at least the start of an agreement which could lay the foundation for 
further work, with Members committing to agree on a comprehensive package to 
discipline harmful fisheries subsidies by the 12th Ministerial Conference.131 
Members have, of course, committed to agree on new disciplines before, but the 
added pressure of Goal 14.6‘s instruction to prohibit subsidies that contribute to 
IUU fishing by 2020, and the commitment demonstrated by a range of diverse 
Members that negotiated strongly for much of 2016 and 2017, might lead one to 
consider it possible. More importantly, as discussed further below, fisheries 
subsidies disciplines represent a nexus of interests, between a WTO in need of an 
environmentally sound and development focused ‗win‘ and an international 
                                                                                                                                        
2019/malmstrom/blog/protecting-global-fisheries-through-wto_en. Note, the EU also 
includes sustainable fishing provisions in its proposed economic partnership agreements 
(EPAs). See Economic Partnership Agreement between the West African States, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), of the one part, and the European Union and 
its Member States, of the other part art. 47, COM/2014/0578 final. 
128 See EU proposal, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/181 (Oct. 20, 2016) 
129 See EU proposal, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/181/Rev.1 (Jul. 6, 2017). This proposal is 
the point of reference for EU proposals discussed below. 
130 A useful ‗matrix‘ compiling the different elements of proposals, as of 28 July 2017, was 
circulated to Members of the WTO.  World Trade Organisation, Compilation Matrix of 
Textual Proposals Received to Date, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/273 (Jul. 18, 2017). 
131 World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Conference, Ministerial Decision on Fisheries 
Subsidies, Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017, ¶ 1, WT/MIN(17)/W/5 (2017). 
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community that needs a binding commitment from States beyond general 
exhortation that is embedded in an institution praised (rightly or wrongly) for its 
compliance mechanisms.132 
 
The interest in meeting SDG 14.6 is also a pressing one, and while the WTO may 
be seen as an ideal option in many quarters, the completion of the Goal has 
overcome any explicit preference for a specific institution. For example, note the 
EU Trade Commissioner‘s frustration at the end of the 11th Ministerial 
Conference, that ―the sad reality is that we did not even agree to stop subsidising 
illegal fishing‖ as a result of a few blocking Members, and that ―short-term 
plurilateral arrangements within the WTO framework‖ were the most likely target 
for agreements in the meantime.133 The US similarly echoed the view that progress 
amongst ―like-minded‖ groups of Members was more likely than at the WTO.134 
This suggests that in the short term, while negotiations may continue at the WTO, 
they will also continue in other forums, ensuring that Members‘ interests in 
shaping such future rules are embedded as early as possible. However, as the 
development of the fisheries talks shows, this is not a binary decision of selecting 
between regional or multilateral institutions, or between environmental or trade 
regimes, but rather part of the cross-jurisdictional rule-elaboration process that 
increasingly marks international law.135 
 
Each interested party from governments, civil society, and international 
organisations to private industries, has pushed for an agreement where it is most 
possible at that moment in time, be it at the multilateral level at the WTO, at the 
regional level in the CPTPP (and historically in the EU), or at the plurilateral level 
with the ‗go-it-alone‘ group of CPTPP and other States.  
 
C. The Envisaged Role for the WTO in the Regulation of Fisheries Subsidies. 
It is one thing to decide that the WTO should be the forum where the 
subsidisation of fisheries is regulated, and another to determine the scope and 
method of such regulation.136 A number of proposals and papers have been tabled 
                                                        
132 See infra Part V. 
133 WTO meeting ends in discord, ministers urge smaller-scale trade talks, REUTERS (Dec. 
13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-wto/wto-meeting-ends-in-discord-
ministers-urge-smaller-scale-trade-talks-idUSKBN1E71IJ.  
134 Id. 
135 See MESSENGER, supra note 77. 
136 This article does not examine the legal nature of the proposed discipline. For a recent 
treatment of this issue, see L. BARTELS & T. MORGANDI, supra note 93.  
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by members at the Negotiating Group on Rules.137 These proposals seek to clarify 
and develop a set of rules which will support the achievement of SDG 14.6. 
 
There are a number of contentious points relating, in the first instance, to the 
application of such disciplines. For example, to what extent should they apply to 
developing members or LDC members? The proposals provide a variety of 
possibilities on this point, from excluding the application of some disciplines to 
LDC members where fish stock management plans are in place138 to excluding the 
application of the disciplines to LDC or developing members‘ subsidies for small 
boats involved in subsistence fishing or small-scale artisanal fishing.139 
 
Related to the scope of the disciplines are the provisions for technical assistance 
and capacity building. Appreciating that S&DT is only one part of an effective 
system for integrating developing and LDC Members and to ensure an equitable 
distribution of obligations, technical assistance and capacity building play a greater 
role in a number of proposals.140 This arguably represents a continuation of the 
policies enacted in the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA),141 seeking to embed 
technical assistance and capacity building within the legal framework of the WTO, 
whereby developing and LDC Members can seek targeted assistance in 
implementing the TFA. 
 
A further challenge is the jurisdictional scope of the proposed disciplines. This too 
has an important S&DT dimension as a possible exclusion of particular note is the 
use of subsidies for fishing within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a 
member.142 The ACP proposal would exclude for LDCs and developing Members 
―[f]ishing activities, which exclusively exploit domestic fish stocks whose ranges are 
confined to the Members‘ EEZ‖.143 This position is echoed by the LDC group.144 
This is of particular concern given the SDG 14.6 mandate which does not 
specifically target fisheries subsidies for fishing outside of waters under national 
jurisdiction but rather IUU, overfishing, and overcapacity, wherever it may take 
place. 
                                                        
137 Supra note 128.   
138 See supra note 129 art. 4.2. 
139 See supra note 129 art. 4; Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay 
proposal, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/187/Rev.2 ¶ 1.1.4 (July 17, 2017) respectively. 
140See Indonesia proposal, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/189 art. 3.6 (June 6, 2017); Argentina 
et al proposal, supra note 139 art. 4.1; LDC proposal, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/193 art. 
3.4 (July 17, 2017).  
141 Trade Facilitation Agreement, Feb. 22, 2017, art. 21, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tfa-nov14_e.htm. 
142 See Indonesia proposal, supra note 140 art. 3.4.  
143 See ACP paper, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/192, ¶ 4.2 (2017).  
144 See LDC paper, TN/RL/GEN/193, ¶ 2.2.b.  
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It is telling that a number of separate issues are also examined in varying degrees 
within the proposals, requiring discussions within a forum more accustomed to 
contemplating rules that engage with trade more narrowly. For example, what of 
the inclusion of disciplines to cover subsidies relating to inland fisheries or 
aquaculture where the possible harm is not related to fish stocks per se, or the issue 
of whether there should be exclusions for instances of disaster relief?145 Should the 
disciplines apply to maritime zones which are subject to a dispute between 
Members?146 Each of the questions tests the resolve and appropriateness of the 
trade system to manage issues that are customarily within the remit of the law of 
the sea or general international law. 
 
The proposals demonstrate a fascinating willingness to engage in innovative 
approaches to problems that trade law has not had to tackle. For example, the 
proposals are largely in agreement that the attribution of prohibited subsidies to a 
Member is not determined by the flag of the vessel which benefits, as flag of 
convenience is a common practice and that it is more effective to tackle the 
subsidy at the source.147 
 
While innovative solutions are required, Members have been quick to buttress their 
proposals with the existing strengths of the WTO system, such as on the issue of 
the existence of a ‗subsidy‘.148 Here, proposals indicate that the subsidies to be 
covered are those that constitute subsidies under Article 1.1 of the SCM 
Agreement, and are specific in terms of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. The 
SCM Agreement would still apply in absence of any specific fisheries subsidy.149 
The disciplines would thus apply to a specific subsidy with a purpose or effect listed 
(such as contributing to IUU fishing). This ensures that the additional rules on 
fisheries subsidies form a part of the WTO‘s wider system for regulation of 
harmful subsidies. 
 
D. The Role of the Law of the Sea Regime 
The use of other regimes of global governance is an important feature of the 
fisheries proposals, particularly the law of the sea regime.150 For example, it is 
                                                        
145 See Argentina et al proposal, supra note 139,   n. 3. 
146 See China proposal, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/195 arts. 3.1-3.3 (Nov. 1, 2017). 
147 See New Zealand, Iceland, and Pakistan proposal, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/186 art. 3 
(June 6, 2017); supra note 129, art. 1 n. 1. 
148 Supra note 86, art. 11. 
149 See supra note 147, ¶ 3.6. 
150 For a concise account of the dynamics between the law of the sea and fisheries 
subsidies:, see M. YOUNG, The ‗Law of the Sea‘ Obligations Underpinning Fisheries Subsidies 
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expected that the concept of IUU fishing will be understood in line with the 2001 
FAO International Plan of Action on IUU fishing,151 which once incorporated in 
the new disciplines will become the reference point for WTO law.152 Similarly, 
RFMOs are expected to play a core role as it is their lists of vessels engaged in IUU 
fishing that are to be presumed to be valid,153 as well as determine which stocks are 
overfished.154 Members‘ own national authorities will also be able to make 
equivalent determinations on the basis of the best evidence available to them. 
Some proposals have gone further by classifying those subsidies as prohibited that 
contribute to any fishing for stocks in waters where the member is not a party to 
the relevant RFMO, an approach which chimes with the assumption that 
international fishing fleets are the primary causes of injury in this field.155 
 
Measures to ensure compliance with the new disciplines have also been proposed 
to be linked to the law of the sea regimes. For example, the Port State Measures 
Agreement (PSMA) model,156 whereby access to ports by vessels engaged in IUU 
fishing is denied,157 has been suggested as an approach under the disciplines on 
fisheries subsidies.158 The exact mechanics for this under WTO law is unclear, 
particularly in light of the obligations on freedom of transit under Article V of the 
GATT.159 Further, whether this would be the only form of remedy is not settled. 
Direct challenge to a subsidies programme under the dispute settlement system 
                                                                                                                                        
Disciplines(ICTSD, Nov. 2017), https://www.ictsd.org/themes/environment/research/the-
‗law-of-the-sea‘-obligations-underpinning-fisheries-subsidies.  
151 All but the ACP proposal use the definition provided therein as a model. Food & Agr. 
Org. Fisheries & Aquaculture Dep‘t., International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Mar. 2, 2001), 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/fisheries/iuu/ipoa.pdf. 
152 The nature of the reference (i.e. direct incorporation or dynamic reference) will depend 
on the legal form the disciplines take and their precise wording. See the discussion in the 
EU context, Yoshimichi Ishikawa, Post-Buenos Aires: Tackling Fisheries Subsidies Contributing to 
IUU Fishing through Unilateral Trade Measures?, EJIL: TALK! (JAN. 12, 2018), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/post-buenos-aires-tackling-fisheries-subsidies-contributing-to-iuu-
fishing-through-unilateral-trade-measures/. 
153See supra note 129, art. 2.1; supra note 147, art.1.1.1; ACP proposal, WTO Doc. 
TN/RL/GEN/192 n. 3 (July 14, 2017). 
154See ACP proposal, supra note 153, Definitions; EU proposal, supra note 129, n. 3bis; New 
Zealand et al. proposal, supra note 147, Definitions; LDC proposal, WTO Doc. 
TN/RL/GEN/193 n. 4 (July 17, 2017). 
155 E.g., New Zealand et al. proposal, supra note 147, art.1.1.2.  
156 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing 2009, 55 I.L.M.6, 1157 (2016) [hereinafter PSMA]. 
157Id. art. 9.4. 
158 See, e.g., New Zealand et al. proposal, supra note 147, ¶ 3.8. 
159 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 167.  
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would be legally unproblematic but arguably less effective given the length of time 
and costs involved which can serve to discourage Members where a faster self-help 
remedy could be preferable.160A form of countervailing duty, perhaps calculated to 
the value of the subsidy irrespective of its impact on local fishing industries is also 
an option.161 
 
Further, the extent to which measures target not only vessels engaged in IUU 
fishing but also their operators is contentious. While proposals identify both 
vessels and operators (that is the ships and their owners), the question that arises is 
how instances where an operator has multiple vessels and only one is engaged in 
IUU fishing are to be managed. The proposal by Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Panama, Peru and Uruguay shields the other vessels, limiting the application of 
disciplines to the vessels of the operator specifically identified as engaging in 
IUU,162with the alternative holding the subsidised operator to account for the IUU 
fishing of any vessels.163 Without greater clarity on the measures to be used, 
however, it is hard to determine. If port closure is the approach taken, then 
operator-focussed liability could be more effective to ensure compliance (and 
would be in keeping with the rejection of flag-based claims to avoid oversight 
elsewhere in the proposals).  
 
All proposals on the content of the disciplines, definitions, and possible remedies 
demonstrate a willingness to extend the traditional trade rules outside of their 
customary application, thus reframing common trade terms and concepts to adapt 
to the objectives of the negotiating groups involved. The use of RFMOs, in 
particular, is a notable change in the degree to which the WTO is expected to engage 
with other international organisations. Echoing the Chair‘s 2007 text,164 and the 
subsequent provisions in the TPP stressing the need to ensure effective fisheries 
management ―based on the best scientific evidence available and on internationally 
recognised best practices for fisheries management‖,165 the use of RFMOs has 
existing parallels in WTO law. Note the approaches taken in the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), where 
specific institutions are identified and standards produced which are presumed to 
comply with the SPS Agreement, or the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
                                                        
160 It is noteworthy that the vast majority of disputes over subsidies at the WTO are over 
the imposition of countervailing duties rather than the original (alleged) subsidy itself. 
161See supra note 93 and corresponding text. 
162 Argentina et. al proposal, supra note 139 art. 2.1.1. Depending on the nature of the 
subsidy, should the operator be the beneficiary (rather than a discrete vessel), one would 
expect the benefit could be passed through to all vessels of the operator. For example, fuel 
duty rebates granted to the operator would be one such instance. 
163 EU proposal, supra note 129, art. 2. 
164 See Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 111, art. V. 
165 TPP, supra note 119 art. 20.16(3). 
83                 Trade, Law and Development                                  [Vol. 9:54 
 
(TBT Agreement) where specific bodies are not identified but relevant 
international standards may also be used to presume compliance with obligations 
under the Agreement.166  There are differences in this instance, not least that an 
RFMO would not constitute an ‗international standardising body‘ in the sense of 
the TBT Agreement as RFMOs are not open to all Members, only those with an 
interest in the fish stock and maritime area in question.167 Further, while there is 
concern over the capacity of RFMOs to make such determinations effectively, 
considering their scope, and the weight to be given to them,168 should the analysis 
be sound, and used as the basis for a Member‘s determination that a vessel is 
engaged in IUU fishing, or that certain stocks are overfished, one could foresee de 
facto (if not de jure) acknowledgement of RFMO determinations via WTO law. 
 
A related element of evolutionary innovation in WTO governance, discussed in the 
following section, is the proposed increase in the use of notification requirements 
where the WTO is to act as a nexus for trade-related data to support compliance 
and further rule-elaboration. 
 
E. Coordinating Strategies: Information Exchange 
The WTO is customarily identified as a body concerned with tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, which is most notable for its comparatively effective dispute settlement 
system and formally egalitarian (if deadlocked) negotiating arm. Yet, in a post-
Doha world, some of the WTO‘s greatest achievements come not from formal 
dispute settlement (though this has a role to play) or dramatic rule creation but 
through its network of developed Committees functioning as soft-law creators and 
informal dispute settlement forums.169 Within this world, transparency is a key tool 
of the Membership.  
 
In the proposals, a common element is the expansion of the transparency 
obligations under the SCM Agreement. This includes notifying the ‗legal authority 
for the programme‘ which will be of potential use in instances of direct challenge 
through dispute settlement.170 This is an area where Special and Differential 
Treatment is of particular importance given the increased burden this will place on 
Members. While one might consider that if a member is capable of administering a 
                                                        
166 SPS Agreement, supra note 71 art. 2.4 and TBT Agreement, supra note 71, art. 2.5 
respectively. 
167 See Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 359, WT/DS381/AB/R (Oct. 26, 2017). 
168 The Argentina et. al proposal, supra note 139, and the EU proposal, supra note 129, speak 
to these concerns. 
169 See MESSENGER, supra note 77, at 59-68. 
170 See EU proposal, supra note 129, art. 3. 
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subsidy programme, that member may be assumed to also be able to notify it (at 
least as required by Article 25 of the SCM Agreement), this is not always the case, 
not least where a Member does not consider its support to constitute a subsidy. 
The use of transparency instruments is a standard technique in WTO law which 
contains a number of notification requirements from technical barriers to trade, to 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, to regional trade agreements, and services 
commitments.171 The WTO increasingly functions as an overwhelmingly large 
database of trade data and regulatory information. Indeed, one might consider that 
the quantity of data is so great that it is hard to separate the wheat from the chaff. 
Yet, in an age of big-data analysis and transparency, this ought to be welcomed. As 
systems for data access and analysis improve, the hope is that interested parties 
with limited resources will be able to identify measures which could affect them, in 
a way that they could not have previously done (this applies as much to small and 
medium sized enterprises as resource-limited Members). 
 
This model of notifications is already used widely at the WTO, and including 
fisheries data could help to open the possibility of increased compliance through 
publicity of measures,172 and by alerting interested parties to the possibility of 
raising concerns or a subsequent claim (though such action would, potentially, 
require the involvement of national investigating authorities to investigate the 
alleged prohibited or harmful subsidy). 
 
It is also noteworthy that the prior regional proposal found in the TPP similarly 
identifies notifications as a key tool. The TPP model focuses on notifications and 
data collection as part of a wider fisheries management network. The TPP 
specifically instructs parties to ensure that catch data, fleet capacity, status of 
stocks, and total imports and exports are included in their notifications of 
prohibited fisheries subsidies,173 while non-prohibited subsidies are still to be 
notified ―to the extent possible‖ including ―information in relation to other 
fisheries subsidies that the Party grants or maintains… in particular fuel 
subsidies‖.174 The regional approach has been useful in clarifying certain possible 
lines of action for discussion at the multilateral level rather than as a source of 
conflict. Indeed, the Ministerial Decision on Fisheries Subsidies from the 2017 
                                                        
171 With varying levels of success. See the criticism in Communication from the United 
States, Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements 
under WTO Agreements, JOB/GC/148 (Oct. 30, 2017). Nonetheless, as with dispute 
settlement, the WTO‘s success on this front is relative not absolute. 
172 On such processes at the WTO, see M. Footer, Some Theoretical and Legal Perspectives on 
WTO Compliance, 38 NETH. Y.B. INT‘L L. 61 (2007). 
173 TPP, supra note 119 art. 20.16(10). 
174 TPP, supra note 119 art. 20.16(10). 
85                 Trade, Law and Development                                  [Vol. 9:54 
 
11thMinisterial added a specific pledge from Members to ―re-commit to 
implementation of existing notification obligations under Article 25.3 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures thus strengthening 
transparency with respect to fisheries subsidies.‖175 
 
Here transparency is used not only to encourage compliance and good governance, 
but also to support the rule-making process, with the USA‘s proposal on 
transparency explicitly singling out fisheries subsidies as an area where greater 
notification requirements can support Members and ―[w]ith a more comprehensive 
picture of existing programs and their trade and conservation impacts, Members 
will be better positioned to develop fisheries subsidies obligations that would be 
effective in achieving the objectives of addressing the worst forms of subsidies, 
including those that contribute to overfishing, overcapacity, and IUU fishing.‖176 
Trade measure notifications are thus being used to inform rule-elaboration on a 
matter essential for the pursuit of sustainable development.  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is the nature of the WTO as an institution to act as a nexus for ‗trade-related‘ 
issues. The WTO confronts and engages with matters of global interest which 
overlap with its trade remit. This is not wishful thinking but borne out by the 
practice of the institution, whether at a superficial level as in the Committee on 
Trade and Environment, through legal decisions with environmental elements such 
as US-Shrimp or China–Rare Earths,177 through rule elaboration such as the 
Amendment on public health to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights,178 or subsequent debates over private standards in the 
TBT and SPS committees.179 This is not to say that the WTO will regulate all 
matters of ‗non-trade‘ issues, but rather that its competence to act is in practice 
determined not only by the explicit provisions of the WTO agreements but also 
through the complex interactions of the ideological framework in which it exists 
and the epistemic community that administers and embodies it. The WTO acts as a 
forum for government representatives, standard setters, ‗internal‘ institutional 
                                                        
175 World Trade Organisation, 11th Ministerial Conference, Draft Ministerial Decision on 
Fisheries Subsidies, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(17)/W/5 ¶ 4 (Dec. 1, 2017).  
176Supra note 171, ¶ 10. 
177Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998); Panel Report, China – Rare Earths, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS431/R/Add.1 (Mar. 26, 2014). 
178 See Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31 bis, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
179 See MESSENGER, supra note 77, at 150-57. 
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actors such as the Appellate Body, and so on.180 But it is also an independent actor, 
one whose identity is built on its successes. Having faced seventeen years of near 
complete deadlock and increasing challenges from its previously strongest 
supporters, the WTO is in need of a ‗win‘. On this point fisheries subsidies provide 
a convenient shared interest as the international community seeks to achieve the 
SDGs and requires a place where it considers rules are upheld and disputes are 
resolved (something the other principal actors on this topic are unable to achieve 
alone).181 
 
No longer does the WTO only examine matters understood in narrow trade terms, 
nor does it seek to conclude a complete set of agreements and nothing less. 
Instead, the WTO is being empowered to regulate not only the trade effects of 
trade, but also the non-trade effects of trade by trading on its comparative 
strengths: a relatively effective mechanism for ensuring compliance (both through 
notifications and negotiations), and failing this, a respected system for resolving 
disputes. The WTO‘s central role in providing coherence and coordination in 
pursuing the 2030 Agenda should be noted:  
 
―We recognise the role the WTO can play in contributing towards 
achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, in so far as 
they relate to the WTO mandate, and bearing in mind the authority of 
the WTO Ministerial Conference. 
 
We recognise the importance of strengthened coherence in global 
economic policy-making. We underscore the Marrakesh coherence 
mandate, and encourage initiatives for cooperation with other 
international organisations in pursuit of our common objectives, 
while respecting the competence of each organisation.‖182 
 
Turning to problems in commodities‘ trade beyond fish, the lack of data with 
which to take coordinated and considered decisions is one of the greatest 
challenges. Here, the proposals on fisheries can serve as a possible model, with the 
WTO as an information source, with near universal membership serving to 
                                                        
180 On the response of the Appellate Body to the pressures to adapt over the past twenty 
years, see R. Howse, The World Trade Organisation 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary, 
27(1) EUR. J. INT‘L L. 9 (2016). 
181 One could also present a less positive view, that the WTO is in crisis and that success on 
this front would constitute the bare minimum to ensure that the existing legal structures 
that entrench the power of capital globally are maintained. On the role of transnational 
capital and reform, see B.S. CHIMNI, The World Trade Organisation, Democracy and Development: 
A View From the South, 40(1) J. WORLD TRADE 5 (2006). 
182 World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Declaration of 19 December 2015, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(15)/DEC ¶¶ 8-9 (2015) (emphasis added). 
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support the aims of competing interests through the provision of information and 
a forum to deal with the trade-related aspects of such discussions. This need not 
imply an expansion of the WTO‘s competence or the use of the dispute settlement 
system to pursue strictly environmental or social claims – in the case of fisheries 
subsidies. It is only in those instances where fishing subsidies cause adverse effects 
for other Members that such issues arise – as they already do under the SCM 
Agreement. It is important not to elide the dispute settlement system of the WTO, 
the purpose of which is to enforce rights and obligations under the covered 
agreements, with the WTO‘s role as a coordinating and negotiating forum for 
matters in trade. There are good reasons to take a restrictive view of what panels or 
the Appellate Body may examine in interpreting and applying the law propio motu 
(as, in effect, judicial bodies exercising delegated authority), while also taking an 
expansive view of those matters the Membership wish to raise within the WTO as 
a forum for trade matters.183 
 
Moving from the ideological commitment of unity in a legal order to viewing 
competing international organisations as providers of different forms of expertise 
has allowed a subtle cooperative process of rule-development in the case of 
fisheries. Whether or not an agreement is concluded at the WTO, the subtle 
coordination and distribution of work between the FAO, UNEP, UNCTAD, the 
WTO, the OECD, RFMOs, individual States, and civil society has allowed fisheries 
subsidies and SDG 14.6 to at least raise the possibility of an early harvest for the 
SDG project. Indeed, even the seemingly ‗conflictual‘ approach, whereby rules are 
developed by the EU or under the TPP (now CPTPP) rather than at the WTO, 
serves to push the forward the wider process by fleshing out approaches to be 
taken and allowing experimentation in norm development.184 
 
This process is premised on an instrumentalising logic; institutions are not viewed 
as embodying systems of rules but rather systems of options. In the case of the 
WTO, which has long faced criticism for its treatment of ‗non-trade‘ values or 
objectives, to contribute so explicitly to a global priority entails great reputational 
gains, and supports the view that it is still an institution where agreement can be 
reached.  
                                                        
183 Compare Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation art. II.1, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (―The WTO shall provide the common institutional 
framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the 
agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement‖), 
with Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (―The Members recognise that it serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements…‖) (emphasis added in both instances). 
184 On the EU‘s recent ‗internal‘ developments, see supra note 152. 
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This is of particular interest when reflecting on the opportunities that engage with 
commodities as a specific class of goods offer for the pursuit of sustainable 
development and the completion of the 2030 Agenda. The fragmentation of 
international law, which we might equally refer to as specialisation, has had a more 
limited impact on the normative coherence of the international legal order than 
might have been feared but it has had a greater impact on the conceptual coherence 
of the system; one which increasingly tackles complex societal problems through 
nuanced legal instruments at the sharp end of the crisis, rather than at its root. 
While the WTO is increasingly sensitive to the impact of commodity price 
fluctuations and their relationship with wider trade questions such as market 
access,185 there has been little by way of innovation in approaching the challenges 
of commodities‘ trade outside of piecemeal agreements on cotton or food security.  
 
Nonetheless, the process of the negotiations over fisheries subsidies offer 
interesting insights where accepting a wider conception of trade law‘s purpose as 
supportive of, and critical for, sustainable development has accompanied ‗a new 
form of pragmatic multilateralism‘,186 seeking agreement wherever it may be 
possible. For the WTO, this may mean a renewed interest in its ability to offer 
solutions to the problems presented by commodities‘ trade, acting as a nexus for 
different regimes in trade, and finally progressing beyond the slumber of the Doha 
Round.  
                                                        
185 See WTO's Substantive Input for the 2017 High Level Political Forum on Sustainable 
Development, ¶ F(3), 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/14240wtomc.pdf. 
186 World Trade Organisation, Statement by United States Trade Representative at 
Ministerial Conference, Nairobi, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15)/ST/121 (Jan. 25, 2016). 
